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Abstract Drug-trafficking in Colombia has been a widely re-
searched phenomenon, especially now, as the country 
undergoes a transition process with its oldest guerrilla. Now 
more than ever it is fundamental to examine how drug-traffick-
ing organization’s violent activities affect the consolidation of 
peace. This article considers different approaches to study vio-
lence derived from drug-trafficking, in order to advance towards 
the objectives of transitional justice. For that matter, this work is 
based on the idea that drug-trafficking directly generates and re-
produces violence which is fueled by the structural violence pres-
ent in the Colombian context. My thesis supports that this phe-
nomenon deters non-repetition guarantees and weakens 
democracy, which is why, I will develop three main arguments 
that will revolve around the lack of consensus, and the implica-
tions of: considering drug wars as civil wars, how decisions re-
lated to the conceptual apprehension limits the competence of 
international humanitarian law, and the need for holistic strate-
gies capable of facing drug-trafficking’s political and violent 
power. Later, alternatives will be explored around the possibili-
ties that each argument offers, as well as which aspects could 
contribute to a more appropriate approach to combat drug-traf-
ficking. Lastly, I will defend why implementing bottom-up ori-
ented actions can advance towards transitional justice’s interme-
diate and final objectives, as it is the only alternative that escapes 
fatalist, utopian or interventionist scenarios.
Keywords:
New civil war, drug-trafficking, non-repetition, democracy, pea-
ce, violence.
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Narcotráfico en Colombia: La nueva guerra 
civil en contra de la democracia y de la 
construcción de paz
Resumen El narcotráfico en Colombia es un fenómeno am-
pliamente investigado, en especial ahora, cuando el 
país vive un proceso de transición con la guerrilla. 
Hoy más que nunca resulta fundamental examinar cómo las ac-
tividades delictivas de las organizaciones dedicadas al narcotráfi-
co dificultan la consolidación de la paz. Este artículo revisa dife-
rentes acercamientos al estudio de la violencia derivada del 
tráfico de drogas, con el fin de avanzar hacia los objetivos de la 
justicia transicional. Por ello, este trabajo parte de la premisa de 
que el tráfico de sustancias ilícitas genera y reproduce actos cri-
minales promovidos por la violencia estructural en el contexto 
colombiano. Mi tesis sostiene que este fenómeno priva las garan-
tías de no repetición y debilita la democracia, con tres argumen-
tos principales en torno a la falta de consenso y a las implicacio-
nes de considerar las guerras contra las drogas como guerras 
civiles; la forma en la que cierta aprehensión conceptual limita la 
competencia del derecho internacional humanitario, y la necesi-
dad de aplicar estrategias holísticas para encarar el poder político 
y criminal del narcotráfico. Se exploran también las posibilida-
des que brinda cada argumento, y las contribuciones a un acerca-
miento más factible para combatir dicho fenómeno. Por último, 
defiendo por qué las acciones de abajo hacia arriba permitirán el 
avance hacia los objetivos intermedios y finales de la justicia 
transicional, ya que es la única alternativa que se aleja de los es-
cenarios fatalistas, utópicos o intervencionistas.
Palabras clave:
Nueva guerra civil, narcotráfico, no repetición, democracia, paz, 
violencia.
In Colombia, it is well known that one of the key factors in 
the protracted conflict, as well as of the magnitude and the impact 
of violence, has been drug trafficking (Pizarro Leongómez, 2015). 
Considered from different dimensions, drug trafficking has generated 
multiple impingements in Colombian society, determined the course 
of violence and allowed the conflict to continue, especially after the 
“Bonanza Marimbera” opened the market for trafficking cocaine, 
and the rise of big drug cartels like the ones from Cali and Medellín. 
In addition, the political agenda has been oriented by international 
policy. These two combined factors have generated a series of 
dynamics that have established a cyclical pattern around the “War on 
Drugs”, which reproduces scenarios of violence at local levels while the 
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ongoing conflict has contributed to strengthening the international 
political discourse (Gaviria & Mejía, 2011). Altogether, it has become 
a bottleneck to overcome violence and a hindrance to achieving 
transitional justice’s ultimate goals of reconciliation and democracy.
Colombia, Drug-Trafficking and Peace
Within the recent Colombian peace agreement for the end of 
the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace, signed 
between the Government of Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, Ejército del Pueblo - FARC-EP, a 
whole chapter was dedicated to the “Solution to the Problem of Illicit 
Drugs” (Acuerdo de Paz, 2016). Mostly because both negotiating 
teams were aware that drug trafficking is a paramount phenomenon 
to be addressed in order to transition from war to peace. Therefore, 
the main goal of the present text is to analyze different alternatives 
to approach the violence derived from drug-trafficking in order to 
advance toward the final objectives proposed by transitional justice.
The past few decades have made it clear that a repressive 
approach to put an end to drug-trafficking in Colombia has only 
atomized big cartels into numerous armed groups and gangs that 
continue to terrorize the civil population while reinforcing structural 
violence (Duncan, 2009), while becoming a principal impediment 
for peacebuilding, as it fosters the continuation of violent cycles.
The thesis for this work is that drug trafficking in Colombia hin-
ders non-repetition guarantees and the strengthening of democracy. 
Consequently, I will discuss three main arguments to support it. The 
first focuses on the lack of consensus on whether violence derived 
from drug-trafficking organizations is a (new) civil war or not. De-
spite public policy and international discourse being built around 
the slogan “War on Drugs” (Arias, 2017; Armenta & Jelsma, 2015; 
Sandvik & Hoelscher, 2017) or academics using terms as “drug wars” 
(Albarracín & Barnes, 2020; Kalyvas, 2015; Lessing, 2018; Mackey 
& López, 2009) there is not a common ground on the acerbity of 
classifying this type of violence as a kind of war, even if it is ac-
companied with a complement such as new civil war (Kaldor, 2001), 
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postmodern civil war (Giraldo, 2009), or by a substitute, like conflict, 
armed-conflict, or cartel-state conflict as described by Lessing (2018).
The lack of consensus becomes problematic as it limits the possible 
strategies to tackle the issue and determines what jurisprudence may 
–or may not– apply, according to how it is labeled, which leads to 
my second argument. The violence derived from drug-trafficking 
organizations (DTOs)1 lies within a gray zone in international law. 
Drug-trafficking is a kind of organized crime because it comprehends 
a series of actions carried out by a group of people who seek profit 
from illicit activities (UNODC, 2020). The obstacle appears within 
the limitations offered by that framework, since the resulting violence 
is generated by drug-trafficking activities, and there are victims at 
the hands of DTOs armed factions. Hence, civil population is not 
fully covered by the mechanisms designed to protect and to hold 
those accountable of crimes such as displacement, recruitment, and 
massacres that are included in bounding international normative.
The lack of a defined framework to address DTOs violent effects 
in countries like Colombia hinders the success of the transition 
process from war to peace because it prolongates the violent period. 
Therefore, the third and last argument I develop is that an approach 
that tackles the effects of drug-trafficking that is limited to non-
holistic strategies can hamper peacebuilding, where a non-holistic 
strategy is the one that fails to consider violence, deterrence in 
civic and institutional trust, and socio-political, as well as the 
socio-economic impacts of drug-trafficking. The previous elements 
impede the strengthening of democracy and, more worryingly, 
non-repetition, due to the continuum of violence –and as a result, 
contribute to the failure of reaching transitional justice’s objectives.
This text intends to present the current debates and to contribute 
towards the search for alternatives in order for the transition process 
in Colombia to be successful. The aforementioned arguments are 
based on the idea that drug-trafficking generates and reproduces 
direct violence, which is fueled by the structural violence in 
1 Drug-trafficking organizations is a term introduced by Angélica Durán-Martínez in 
her book The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops, and Politicians in Colombia and 
Mexico (2018).
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which Colombian society has developed. Moreover, although the 
discussion is oriented toward the Colombian case, the findings are 
not exclusively reserved to it.
A last segment will be devoted to analyze the possibilities 
to overcome the obstacles that drug-trafficking presents in the 
current scenario in Colombia. In that section, I will deepen on 
why bottom-up peacebuilding strategies that focus on civic trust, 
recognition, and the strengthening of a political culture are the 
only ways to “cleanse” democracy from drug-trafficking’s influence 
in both political powers, and in legality. Also, I will propose the 
future lines of research that I consider pertinent to advance with 
the bottom-up strategies as I acknowledge the rewards of investing 
in political culture as a long shot.
How Much of “War” Fits in Drug-Trafficking?
The literature and academic research about wars and civil wars 
is rich and extensive. In the present, multiple bodies and treaties 
regulate what is allowed during and after violent periods. The 
previous refers to the bounding judicial advances, like the mere 
agreement around ius cogens, ius ad bellum and ius in belum, just to 
mention a few, and how much humanity has learned from wars 
over the past centuries. One of the classical definitions is the one 
proposed by Bobbio (1992), where war is a compound concept with 
three elements: a conflict, between independent political groups 
whose actions are led by organized violence. Another definition for 
war is given by Bouthol as an armed and bloody struggle between 
organized groups (1971, p. 35). The second definition is not only 
wider but also more appropriate for the upcoming discussion.
The evolution of the modern state has reshaped how civil wars 
look like nowadays. Giraldo (2009) points out how after Second 
World War, more specifically after the pacifism powered by Woodrow 
Wilson in Versailles (2009, p. 27), the legacy of the brutality imparted 
in the concentration camps and bombings around Europe, as well 
as the nuclear bombs, created an atmosphere for a “never again” 
feeling that triggered the basic idea of war to shift toward a “burial” 
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of the term. As if the disuse of the word would bury its existence 
altogether. On the contrary, it sacrificed valuable advances in terms 
of tools, debates and historical analysis that have studied war and its 
implications.
Even though wars between states are not today’s patterns, 
violence keeps taking place around the globe for multiple causes 
and between different actors. Overtime civil wars have changed in 
general, technical, motivational, behavioral and positional aspects, 
as the configuration of the international system has advanced on 
setting rules for the coexistence between states. Nonetheless, the 
attempt to bury the word “war” has led to a concept stretching that 
has caused the emergence of new terms which have just added details 
to the original concept of war (Giraldo, 2009, pp. 45-47).
The previous has surfaced new debates around civil wars such 
as the one on new civil wars introduced by Kaldor (2001), and the 
response given by Kalyvas (2015), where the second argues that wars 
have always included a criminal quota, making those “new” and 
“old” wars to lack substantial differences. Most importantly, new 
debates as well as the new concepts to describe postmodern civil 
wars between armed parties has hampered the protection of many 
civilians under emerging violent contexts, as it is the case for the 
victims of the violence exercised by DTOs armed factions.
Drug-Trafficking Derived Violence
A kind of armed confrontation has gained strength over the 
past few decades due to the violent capacity it has showcased and 
how it has been increasingly executed, namely, drug-trafficking. The 
study of the phenomenon as a potentially “new” way of civil war 
has received different names in the literature over recent years, such 
as drug wars (Kalyvas, 2015), cartel-state conflicts (Lessing, 2018), 
or non-conventional violence (Sandvik & Hoelscher, 2017). It has 
been addressed from diverse disciplines and angles (Albarracín & 
Barnes, 2020; Kalyvas, 2015, pp. 1-2), but there is no consensus on 
how to refer to the violence derived from it; in other words, to the 
victims of the armed factions that work for –or are part of– cartels. 
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The previous indicates that despite the growing studies on criminal 
violence, a common conceptual framework is urgently needed.
There is a common ground which catalogues drug-trafficking 
as organized crime. According to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime through the General 
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 2000, an organized criminal group 
refers to
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes 
or offenses established [in the Convention], in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (UNODC, 2004, p. 5).
Even if DTOs fit the description of an organized criminal group, 
there are various reasons why apprehension falls short to fully cover 
the drug-trafficking phenomenon, which will be addressed shortly. 
What I want to highlight is that even if other kinds of trafficking 
like arms, people, or even organs have an organized structure around 
an illegal activity to receive financial or material benefit, and even 
if they also use violence, their organizations do not have as many 
similarities with insurgencies in terms of relations with state and 
civil population as DTOs do.
Both Kalyvas (2015) and Lessing (2018) have studied drug 
trafficking’s organized crime as wars. On one hand, Kalyvas’ starting 
point in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) helped him find that drug 
cartels have three aspects relatable with insurgencies: organization, 
use of violence or combat, and territory and governance (Kalyvas, 
2015). The first corresponds to a hierarchical organization that 
allows cartels to endure and adapt over time, including codes of 
conduct for indoctrination and a chain of command (Staniland, 
2014). The second is the significant use of violence, including 
the possession of sophisticated weaponry in order to protect their 
economic interests, and thirdly, they have the capacity to strip the 
state not only from the monopoly of violence but also of territorial 
control (Kalyvas, 2015). As drug cartels need to control trafficking 
routes, the population in those territories live under DTOs’ rules, 
enabling them to exert control of institutions through bribery of 
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police officers, as well as campaign financing in order to influence 
political decisions.
On the other hand, Lessing (2018) departs from the Tyllian 
perspective under which “states make civil war and civil war makes 
states” (Tilly, 2017). Therefore, he finds common characteristics 
between states and drug cartels. Namely, eliminating armed 
opposition, establishing a monopoly on the use of force, and 
consolidating the rule of law and protection of civilians (Lessing, 
2018, p. 278). In Lessing’s book Making Peace in Drug Wars, he 
analyzes the retribution between corrupt states and cartels, while 
drafting how the fight against drugs has been characterized by 
unfruitful repression that has resulted in an rise of violent activities 
from the cartels’ side (Lessing, 2018). Eventually, the increase in 
cartels’ assorted sources of power has exposed the inability of the 
states to play their role, such as their inability to protect their 
own population, the discredit of institutions, and the disclosure of 
perverse elite interest for the continuation of the conflict due to 
the personal profit acquisition which is indirectly made from drug 
trafficking.
An important aspect on why the description of organized 
crime group fails to fully comprehend DTOs is that many criminal 
groups take analogous form toward the state (Albarracín & 
Barnes, 2020). For example, insurgent and paramilitaries groups in 
Colombia became active in illicit markets to finance their squads 
as well as to fund their political projects (Arias, 2017; Durán-
Martínez, 2018). Another case is the one from El Salvador, where 
existing street gangs were incorporated in the FMLN (Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front) during the country’s civil war, 
where those same groups were later absorbed by the maras after the 
peace agreement (Wolf, 2017). The Zeta’s in Mexico, which were 
originally Mexican and Guatemalan special force units created to 
fight counterinsurgency, later became the armed faction of the Gulf 
cartel (Albarracín & Barnes, 2020; Correa-Cabrera, 2017). Despite 
the group’s origins, their warfare familiarity becomes tempting for 
cartels not only because of their expertise with weapons but also 
because of the context of Latin American countries with relatively 
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young democracies, following an existing violent legacy, and where 
it is not novel to find legality and illegality closely intertwined 
with corruption.
As a result, the lack of a common conceptual framework capable 
of encompassing the characteristics of drug-trafficking has failed 
to properly recognize the victimhood of those who have suffered 
displacement, massacres, selective assassinations, and recruitment 
at the hands of DTOs. In addition, the disuse of the word “war” 
has also impacted this matter; there are currently multiple types of 
armed conflicts that have specific characteristics to be considered 
as such, leaving the civil population at the expense of the agility 
of domestic legal bodies to create legal frameworks to effectively 
protect and repair them.
Drug-trafficking is in fact one kind of transnational organized 
crime, but it also generates systematic violations to human rights. It 
has the ability to cooperate with state actors while it can also play 
as their antagonist; it may not overthrow the political system but 
coerce it in order to continue with its illegal activities. Since drug-
trafficking is such a lucrative business with a considerable amount of 
political and economic power involved, the routes control becomes 
a competition and an armed struggle among different DTOs. As 
a consequence, it is clear that these organizations have a violent 
nature, as they exercise violence on the civil population, whether 
they combat the state or other illegal organizations.
In the introduction to the text it was mentioned that DTOs are 
fueled by the structural violence present in the Colombian context. 
After reviewing the war, civil war and organized crime concepts, it 
is possible to sustain that a definition of organized crime describes 
the interest of the DTOs, but fails to subsume the violence exercised 
over civil population, and against states or other illegal organizations. 
Therefore, over the following sections, drug-trafficking derived 
violence will be understood as a postmodern civil war rooted in 
structural violence, with the resulting relations that link the legal 
and illegal world in the economic and political arenas. Also, the 
need to tackle this war responds to the interest to secure the rule of 
law, as well as to break the cycle of violence.
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Drug-Trafficking Violence: A Gray Zone in 
International Law
Drug wars have taken place mostly in Latin American, more 
specifically in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, where the civil 
population has been placed under a humanitarian crisis framework 
as the number of victims from urban violence, displacements, land 
grabs, massacres and a series of systematic human rights violations 
has risen dramatically throughout the past few decades (Sandvik 
& Hoelscher, 2017). The former has come to the attention of the 
United Nations and other humanitarian organizations such as the 
International Red Cross, and Medecin Sans Frontiers, to mention a 
few, who have been deployed in these countries for over a decade. 
The amount of financial resources allocated to attend these crises 
has been significant. For instance, Colombia received around $7 
billion from the United States between 2000 and 2010 for this 
purpose (Sandvik & Hoelscher, 2017).
As this text focuses on the obstacles for the consolidation of peace 
in Colombia, in the coming section I will use the Colombian case 
to showcase how the violence caused by drug-trafficking is immersed 
in a gray zone in international law. Therefore, the first part of the 
analysis will be made under the “War on Drugs” logic, implemented 
in the country since the beginning of the century, while the second 
segment will refer to general aspects of international law.
Colombia’s War on Drugs
Colombia has not been autonomous in making decisions to deal 
with the scourge of drug trafficking. On the contrary, the country has 
been subordinated to the guidelines demanded and established by the 
United States of America and the United Nations. This was evident 
during the UN Conventions on Drugs promoted by the United States 
in 1961, 1971 and 1988. In the later year, the United States proclaimed 
a frontal declaration of War on Drugs. As a result, the war against 
the world’s cocaine, poppy and marijuana growing communities 
intensified and the immediate political response of the Americans 
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was to declare war on foreign supply (Medina, 2012) rather than 
addressing the reasons that encouraged their domestic consumption.
In the early 1970s, the Andean territories became battlefields, 
and the US prompted the United Nations to summon another 
conference to draft the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The new treaty forced 
countries to radically combat all aspects of illicit drug production 
and imposed new judicial cooperation between countries including 
extradition (Armenta & Jelsma, 2015), an agreement that elevated 
violence in Colombia (Duncan, 2013). During the late 80s and early 
90s Colombia went through a dark chapter of its history as the DTOs 
openly fought the government and terrorized civil society.
The plan revolved around the US oriented policy known as 
“Plan Colombia”, which not only defined the fight against drugs 
but also impacted the armed conflict dynamic in the country 
(Uprimny & Saffon, 2011). During the implementation of this 
plan there were several human rights violations carried out from 
both legal and illegal armed actors, as the labels shifted from an 
armed conflict to terrorism. The lack of a defined conceptual 
framework for the derived violence of drug-trafficking favored the 
strengthening of DTOs, and left the civil population unprotected, 
since the targets of direct violence were not considered victims of 
an armed group, but rather as sufferers of organized crime, as if 
there was no existing political interest in play. This serves as an 
additional example of the consequence of foregoing the use of war 
as a prevailing concept.
In subsequent years, President Santos summoned the Summit 
of the Americas in 2012 to promote a special session of the United 
Nations to rethink the fight against drugs. During the 2016 
UNGASS session, Santos gave a reformist speech calling for a shift 
in the anti-crop focused policies for a novel strategy that respected 
the rights of coca grower peasants and their families (Santos, 2016). 
However, this idea did not see the light because Santos continued to 
intensify the war against drugs in Colombia with the old dynamics 
that favored eradication at the expense of poverty perpetuation in 
the most affected rural areas.
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These dynamics display the inconsistencies between the 
discourses presented worldwide and the practical inability that the 
Colombian government has shown to transform the dynamics of 
drug policies in the country. This is surely tied to the military pressure 
that the U.S. government has constantly exerted on Colombia 
demanding rapid but unsustainable results in crop eradication, in 
addition to the threat of international discredit if the country fails 
to comply with the international commitments on drugs set by 
the North American government in the different conferences and 
international arenas.
International Law and Drug Trafficking
According to the previous section, drug-trafficking related activities 
have directly impacted the armed conflict in Colombia. Financing 
armed conflicts necessarily includes illegal activities, which may 
include extortion, ransoms, smuggling, drugs, etc. (Cox, 2017, p. 128). 
After all, there is a certain logic of illegal groups financing their actions 
from illegal economies. What has not been as clear under international 
law is the proximity between gross and systematic human rights 
violations generated by DTOs and the mandate from international law 
enforcement bodies over those crimes. The victims of DTOs derived 
violence are somehow in a gray area lacking recognition as they are not 
victims within an armed conflict context.2 In fact, it can be argued that 
this creates a second-class victimhood, which forecasts the necessity to 
adjust the scope to read these specific scenarios.
The mandate of the International Criminal Court includes 
four sets of crimes: crimes against humanity “committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population”, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and genocide (ICC, 
2011), none of which include drug-trafficking, resulting in these 
2 While victims are in a kind of gray area, some light had shed over DTOs on this 
regard. For example, Haer (2015) examines whether organizational structures of armed 
groups influence patterns of human rights violations, and Staniland (2014) studies how 
organizational cohesion of insurgent groups explain civil war outcomes. This helps to 
understand how armed groups’ internal organization influence levels of violence, and 
contribute to address DTOs adaptability inside and outside armed conflict contexts.
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victims to be dependent on the political decisions made by the 
governments. As it has been mentioned in the previous sections, 
drug trafficking’s main objective is economic (Sainz-Borgo, 2012) and 
it is not necessarily circumscribed within an armed conflict, which 
is why it is typified as organized crime under the UN’s Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime.
In that line, one tempting proposal could be to include the 
derived violence from DTOs in the mandate of international 
humanitarian law, not the crop-growing, transportation, selling or 
money laundering process, but to hold accountable those responsible 
for gross human rights violations despite not being a guerrilla, 
paramilitaries, or militaries. As the evidence from Brazil, Mexico and 
Colombia proves, the violence exercised by DTOs meets the criteria 
to be considered as a threat to peace, security and human rights, 
because they engage in systematic violations of crimes contemplated 
by the Rome Statute. They also meet the war criteria as they 
generate conflict, fight other armed legal and illegal organizations, 
and are guided by organized violence. Moreover, DTOs are actors in 
an armed and bloody struggle among organized groups as it had been 
shown while discussing the concept of war.
A similar approach could be valuable to countries with illegal 
economies in African and South Eastern Asian countries that 
have criminal organizations structured similarly as armed-groups, 
like DTOs. Unfortunately, this is not a very feasible approach to 
Colombia or hardly any country for various reasons. Firstly, because 
of the power needed within the international community for it to 
be in the agenda, debate, approval and agreement to modify the 
Rome Statute. Secondly, since Colombia recently became a member 
of the OECD (Organization for the Economic Co-operation and 
Development) and it goes against the national interest in the 
international arena (El Tiempo, 2020). Thirdly, due to the blow to 
sovereignty that such an intervention would represent, especially 
after the set-up of the Truth Commission and the Special Jurisdiction 
for Peace negotiated in Havana.
As a result, the derived violence from DTOs is within a gray 
zone in the international law arena, since half of the drug-trafficking 
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phenomenon is met by the public international law normative as 
transnational organized crime. The other half fails to adequately 
address the victims of such groups beyond a humanitarian crisis 
treatment. This is an important discussion to be held while trying to 
overcome such violent settings, where the civil population depends 
on individual political decisions that might have been persuaded 
or threatened by DTOs, which makes it difficult to judge those 
responsible of atrocity, or to guarantee non-repetition.
As Uprimny suggests, a legal debate around the crimes that 
should be included as part of international obligation could benefit 
from a broader application of the duty extending to all behaviors 
that could be considered as “gross violations of human rights” 
(Sánchez & Uprimny, 2019, p. 28), especially when the goal is to 
protect civilians over prosecuting individuals; the broader the scope, 
the wider the mechanisms to prevent, protect and repair.
Transitioning in the Middle of War
Transitional justice is characterized by being an exceptional 
time under which exceptional measures are taken. It can be defined 
as a concept of justice associated with political change (Teitel, 2003, 
p. 19), as it attempts to target democracy over the lapse of time taken 
to shift from violent logic to societal norms –under the frame of rule 
of law. Within its interest there is a retrospective and a prospective 
(Van Zyl, 2011) approach. It gives importance to understanding what 
happened, and why, while planning where society is heading, how 
it will be achieved, and what is needed to get there. During the 80s, 
transition was mostly based on a “forgive and forget logic” (Sánchez 
& Uprimny, 2019); it has become more demanding over time.
The advances made in the field of international law over the 
past four decades have contributed towards a binding nature for the 
implementation of most transitional justice mechanisms in war-torn 
societies. Its framework and fundamental principles are collected 
under different international instruments such as the Rome Statute, 
treaties, conventions, customary practice, United Nations resolutions, 
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the jurisprudence of the International Courts and doctrine, among 
others (Cohen, 2006, pp. 59-88). The requirement of transitional 
justice measures is to provide the maximum reestablishment of human 
rights in the interest of peacebuilding, democracy, and reconciliation.
Hence, transitional justice sets a series of measures to address 
the legacy of massive human right abuses, classified by two levels 
of objectives: intermediate and final. Within the first group are 
the recognition and the promotion of civic trust, while the latter 
includes reconciliation, and democracy (De Greiff, 2009, p. 44). The 
former reveals the final goal to help societies with violent conflict 
settings by establishing a democratic system that allows citizens 
to reaffirm the social contract. That means, (re)building reliable 
institutions, a competent judicial system and independent press 
(Quinn, 2009). Likewise, it exhorts individuals to overcome Us vs. 
Them logics in order to foster recognition and civic trust, whilst 
aiming for reconciliation –either as coexistence or forgiveness.
The four mechanisms –justice, truth, reparation and guarantees 
of non-repetition– are to be implemented holistically. They are 
aligned with Van Boven’s proposal in the formulation of victims’ 
rights when he served as UN’s Special Rapporteur in 2005 (Van 
Boven, 2010, p. 5). It is worth noting that each of these mechanisms, 
despite being intertwined, are a whole world of literature on their 
own. They enclose other aspects of peacebuilding as studies on 
memory (Jelin, 2003), forgiveness (Tutu, 1999), vengeance (Minow, 
1999), and language (Suárez & Lizama-Mué, 2020), among many 
others. At the same time, they can be addressed from different 
approaches such as gender, territorial, or ethnic perspectives.
Finally, it is imperative to distinguish between the holistic 
perspective of transitional justice mechanisms, as well as the lessons 
learned in previous cases3 from the inexistence of a recipe for success 
(Bloomfield, 2006). Transitional justice, including the universe of 
phenomena and conflict-related problems it encompasses, starts with 
adapting to the context (Bloomfield et al., 2003). There is no such 
thing as a one-size-fits-all in this arena. Literature has repeatedly 
3 For example, South Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Northern Ireland, among others.
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shown that what works in one place, does not necessarily work in 
another, even within the same country (Quinn, 2009). Intendedly, 
it is up to each state to formulate its own4 strategy that responds 
adequately to its context, including as much as it can from the four 
mechanisms aforementioned.
Transitional Justice in Colombia
Colombia’s transition path is not new, the country has been 
immersed in multiple negotiations and agreements in the past 
three decades. Some have been successful and have resulted in the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of guerrillas like 
M-19 (Gobierno & M-19, 1990), Quintín Lame, Ejército de Liberación 
Popular (EPL), and Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) 
during the late 80s and early 90s. It is also important to frame these 
negotiations in a context where the Cold War was getting to an end, 
and guerrilla wars started to lose political and economic support.
Meanwhile, the world dealt with massive human rights 
violations that challenged the response of the international system 
to address the legacy of systematic violence, as it was the case of the 
Rwandan genocide (1994) and the Bosnia genocide (1995), without 
mentioning a long list of civil wars catalogued as protracted internal 
conflicts around the world. The previous is highly relevant because 
that was when the young field of transitional justice strengthened 
and delimited its objectives in accordance with what is expected 
from transition. Accordingly, as time has passed by, international 
law and international humanitarian law have become stronger and 
stricter on the expectations from states, actors, justice and repair. 
Ergo, “forgive and forget” was no longer a sufficient strategy to 
confront the legacy of gross human rights violations.
During 2005, the government of Colombia passed the 975 
Law known as Peace and Justice, a byproduct of the private talks 
in San José de Ralito, Córdoba, between the paramilitary group 
4 Or with the assistance of the international community as in the case of Sierra Leone.
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Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and the government. 
Peace and Justice law is, without hesitation, another mayor 
reference in the field of transitional justice in the country. Mainly 
because this was the first time such ideas were introduced in 
the national context (Uprimny & Guzmán, 2010) but, mostly, 
because it provided a legal framework where members of criminal 
organizations –AUC paramilitaries– appeared before a court to 
face conspiracy to commit crime allegations. Nonetheless, the 975 
Law is highly controversial; critics have considered that it lacks 
mechanisms capable to assure truth, reparation and non-repetition 
guarantees5 (Guzmán et al., 2010). Additionally, several studies 
have focused on evaluating Peace and Justice law limitations and 
outcomes (Ambos et al., 2018; Gómez y Correa, 2015; Chavarría, 
2012), where some have found that even though the process is one 
of a kind, it represented serious discrepancies with transitional 
justice goals and objectives.
Peace and Justice was not a victim-centered process (Torregrosa, 
2011). On the contrary, the law was a result of the government’s interest 
to dismantle a criminal organization within a “terrorism context”, were 
the least of interests was recognizing the existence of an ongoing armed 
conflict. Another main criticism came after changes were introduced 
and suggested by the Constitutional Court to the 975 law, where 
reconciliation and forgiveness expectations were highly questioned by 
victims, victims organizations and human rights advocates (Aponte, 
2011; López & Castellanos, 2014). Victims were deliberately encouraged 
to play along their role on transition and to grant forgiveness to former 
AUC combatants with little to no guarantees or structural changes 
(Delgado, 2011, 2015; Uprimny & Saffon, 2008). For instance, authors 
like Cuervo (2017) have affirmed that Peace and Justice law was 
conceived within a macro-criminal context that turns it in a policy of 
submission to justice. He even argues Peace and Justice contravenes the 
very principles of criminal law, and impedes it to be acknowledged as 
a process that complies with the principles of truth, justice, reparation 
and non-repetition guarantees.
5 This led to a change in the original project introduced by the Sentence C-370/2006.
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As a consequence, the article will not focus on the Peace and 
Justice experience as there is not enough space to properly address 
its potential contributions to this particular debate. Moreover, 
since there are several incongruences between the process and the 
transitional justice vision apprehension that this article endorses: 
the relevance of the victims at the core of the transition process. 
Nonetheless, further research is encouraged on the lessons learned 
from Peace and Justice to deal with DTOs and their derived violence.
On another note, it is most likely that the truth and justice 
interest of the Colombian government was grounded on the practices 
introduced by bodies like the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), 
the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland (1999), the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (1996), Chapultepec 
Peace Accords of El Salvador (1992), the National Commission for 
the Truth and Reconciliation in Chile (1990), and the National 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons in Argentina (1983). 
It is not random that the Final Accords (2016) with FARC guerrilla 
constantly refer to these processes as examples to determine what is 
essential in the present transition.
A second part of the transition process in Colombia started with 
the Peace Agreement signed in 2016 with former FARC guerrilla 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) negotiated in 
Havana, Cuba and signed in Bogota. In order to activate the 
mechanisms suggested by transitional justice, three main institutions 
were created: Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) by the Statutory 
Law 1957 of 2019; the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, 
Coexistence and Non-Repetition by the decree Law 588 of 2017; and 
the Unit for the Search of Persons Reported Missing in the context 
and because of the armed conflict by the decree Law 589 of 2017. It 
is also important to remember that Colombia approved the Rome 
Statute by the Law 742 in 2002, which entered in effect the same 
year (except for crimes against humanity), which come into effect 
from 2009. In this way, Colombia kept the sovereignty to administer 
justice by its own without an intervention from the International 
Criminal Court.
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Drug-Trafficking and Transitional 
Justice in Colombia
Overcoming drug-trafficking in Colombia is pivotal to advance 
peace in the country. One example is the Peace Agreement signed 
with the M-19 guerrilla in the early 90s, which in its Point Six 
calls for the assembling of a non-governmental, autonomous and, 
independent academic commission to investigate the national and 
international dimensions of the phenomenon in terms of production, 
trafficking and consumption of drugs.
Also, in previous negotiation attempts, during the Common 
Agenda for Change Towards a New Colombia in 1999, FARC 
proposed twelve points for the negotiation agenda with the National 
Government. In this proposal, drug trafficking came under Point 
Six, entitled: “justice reform, fight against corruption, and drug 
trafficking” (Gov. of Colombia, 1999). This was not gratuitous; it 
was in response to what Colombian history has shown, due to the 
relevance that drug-trafficking and DTOs have had over the civil 
war in the country.
Under the administration of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-
1978) was operated the “sinister window”, where illegally constructed 
fortunes were legalized through money laundering in the Central 
Bank as under-invoicing of imports (Medina, 2012, p. 150). This 
serves as an example on how legality and illegality do not fall far 
behind from each other. In Colombia it is easy to find examples 
of illegality bringing legality as the case of Puerto Asís, Putumayo 
(Torres, 2012), where drug trafficking injected enough capital for the 
town to claim administrative power.
For instance, a way to show how this practice impacted the national 
economy was the disproportionate increase in its international 
reserves, which did not follow the country’s growth rate. While in 
1968 the net reserves were US$35M, in 1981 they reached US$5,630M 
(Castillo, 1987). This was favorable during the so-called “lost decade 
of Latin America”, but it was counterproductive in subsequent years 
as drug lords were cornered and ultimately hit causing the decrease of 
the cash flow and the emergence of new DTOs.
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During the war, guerrillas and paramilitary groups found new ways 
to finance their activities, obtain weapons, and recruit more men 
through money from cocaine in its different production stages. By 
taking advantage of the lack of state presence in rural territories, 
they became the law and order in the places with the greatest 
number of illicit crops. These actors even began to charge a certain 
type of “tax” on drug production and exports (Uribe, 1997) to 
fund their ranks and operations (Vargas, 1999). The Colombian 
economy received an estimated $2 to $4 billion in the mid- 1980s 
and $2.5 billion annually during the 1990s (Thoumi, 2002). The 
influence of drug cartel money and illegal armed actors was such, 
that any criminal group capable of exporting fifty thousand tons of 
cocaine per year was comparable to the net profits of the country’s 
most prominent companies. Eventually, drug trafficking gained 
the capacity to change the economic power structure in Colombia 
(Thoumi, 1995), showing the economic capacity of DTOs that has 
been ultimately used to coerce the effective actions of institutions 
responsible for fighting them.
The peace process in Havana made an advance toward a more 
appropriate way to approach the fight against illicit drugs (González, 
2013), since the process and the agreement encourage public debate 
on re-evaluating the anti-drug policy and illicit crops. The Accords 
recognize it is a vital issue for overcoming violence and peacebuilding 
in the country.
Nonetheless, since the Peace Agreement was signed, coca 
production in Colombia has increased (El Tiempo, 2020). Coca 
cultivation reached 212 000 hectares in 2019 from 208 000 hectares 
in 2018, while coca production increased by 8 % to 951 metric tons 
in 2019, from 879 metric tons in 2018 (White House, 2020). In 2019, 
the Ombudsperson Office reported the presence of Mexican cartels 
in the country (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2019), and simultaneously, 
the presence of new armed groups who seek to consolidate territorial 
and trafficking routes control (El Espectador, 2019).
New groups have brought a new wave of violence over rural 
territories where the state was unsuccessful to fill the gap left by 
FARC. More importantly, in addition to an active guerrilla –ELN 
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(National Liberation Army, in English), several residual groups 
from the AUC demobilization, dissident groups of FARC and the 
new armed groups associated– or part of- DTOs, Colombia is facing 
transition sunken in an ongoing armed conflict.
The implications of pursuing the transition from war to peace 
while the violence continues backs my thesis of the inability to 
guarantee non-repetition or the strengthening of democracy for two 
main reasons. The first is that the implementation of the Agreements 
becomes harder when other armed groups remain active, especially 
demobilization, as it becomes easier for former combatants to either 
join another group or be recruited due to their experience. A second 
reason is that as long as DTOs’ derived violence is not considered 
closely relatable to those of illegal armed groups in conflict, new 
victims will be generated at their expense. In other words, even if the 
government of Colombia signed a peace agreement with ELN, the 
state would still not regain the monopoly of violence as DTOs would 
continue to control, terrorize and make use of their warring power.
Additionally, over 555 social leaders have been assassinated 
across the country between 2016 and 2019 (Defensoría del Pueblo, 
2019). Human rights defenders and social leaders have been targeted 
for being spokespersons supporting the implementation of Peace 
Agreements, specifically, Point 4 on crop substitution. The War on 
Drugs implemented under the supervision of the United States has 
failed for decades. Failing to recognize drug wars as a new kind of 
civil war that has adapted to the contemporary context is to turn our 
backs on civilians living in areas dominated by these organizations. 
Beyond their interests, differences or similarities with insurgencies, 
the violent capacity of DTOs is harming hundreds. The question is: 
Where does the emphasis lie? In the responsibility to protect or in 
the existing legal boundaries?
Unfortunately, for the Colombian case, the special bodies have 
limited mandate over the derived violence of drug-trafficking. For 
instance, the Truth Commission, under the decree Law 588 of 2017 
Art. 11.11 has the mandate to establish “the relationship between 
conflict and illicit crops, production and commercialization of illicit 
drugs, and the laundering of assets derived from the phenomenon 
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from the drug trade” oriented in non-repetition. The Commission 
lacks teeth to introduce structural changes on how the drug war 
should be faced, as it is limited by the production of recommendations.
Likewise, JEP’s mandate also falls short to punish drug-trafficking 
as a generator of systemic human rights violence, as it already emitted 
amnesties for those linked to drug-trafficking as a political-related 
offense. Primarily, because they included it within the mandate with 
the specific interest of avoiding extradition for FARC Secretariat, 
and because as it has been mentioned before it is considered as 
a transnational crime. Furthermore, JEP is not including drug-
trafficking as one of its seven macro-cases, mainly because such 
crimes fall out of the scope of the jurisdiction in alignment with 
the Rome Statute. The previous can be understood as it responds to, 
what I would like to call, three principles for special mechanisms: 
prioritization, expectations control, and institutional capacity. The 
pursuit of drug-trafficking as a crime at the JEP could potentially 
contribute to overflow the quality of the court’s outcomes, especially 
with such limited jurisprudential, and conceptual, resources to 
legally address DTOs derived violence.
Drug-trafficking in Colombia has defined the course of violence, 
as it is described by the Historical Commission of the Conflict and 
its Victims (Duncan, 2015; Giraldo, 2015; Pizarro Leongómez, 2015). 
It has contributed to the consolidation of the interrelation among 
insurgencies and private security groups, as well as the bonds between 
national and periphery elites whose accumulation of economic 
resources has allowed them to gain autonomy from central power. At 
the same time such accumulation has impacted the national political 
dynamic (Pizarro Leongómez, 2015, p. 69), including phenomena 
like parapolítica and narco-política. This relation between DTOs and 
political powers at local, regional and national levels has contributed 
to the persistence of civil war in Colombia.
The decentralization process after the Constitution of 1991 
introduced the transfer of national resources to municipalities and 
–unintendedly– ended up fostering a close relation between ballots 
and weapons, a connection that made it easy for DTOs to expand 
their influence over political and economic decisions in the country. 
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Not only political candidates and public servants were targeted 
and assassinated but also voters were constraint as decentralization 
allowed major control over territories with less effort through securing 
local institutional power. The main example of the way in which 
drug trafficking permeated politics is the Proceso 8000, the biggest 
political corruption scandal in Colombian history (López Restrepo, 
1997). The election of the president-elect for the 1994-1998 period, 
Ernesto Samper, was challenged on the grounds of alleged improper 
campaign financing. The previous depicts the dimension and impact 
of “informal” negotiations between state agents and organized crime, 
such as the parapolitica scandals.
As a result, drug wars not only endanger but also obstruct 
democracy and the possibility of a transition to more peaceful 
societies. One of the main differences between insurgencies and 
organized crime groups, such as DTOs, is that the first have a 
political and ideological agenda, while the second is only interested 
in protecting its economic activity6 (Kalyvas, 2015). Despite this 
difference, both of them can coordinate and associate to activate, or 
allow violence for the sake of personal financial or material benefits.
Despite being relatively new when compared to criminal law 
studies, transitional justice is able to adapt to emerging contextual 
demands. In this regard, transition in Colombia is not likely to 
succeed if the effects of drug-trafficking over democracy and over 
civil population do not cease. They ought to be addressed with 
holistic strategies that directly tackle violence, fragile civic trust, 
socio-political and socio-economic effects over society. As an 
example, nowadays postbellum seems too limited or inappropriate 
because of the unstable or undermined boundaries between conflict 
and post-conflict situations (Teitel, 2013, p. 339). Probably, drug 
wars comprehension and recognition has been limited. Human 
rights revolution has waged in the context of new constraints and 
expectations of democratization, meaning that the postbellum justice 
needs to transcend earlier limits and address security not solely for 
states but also for people (Teitel, 2013, p. 342).
6 Protecting their economic activity includes but is not limited to: territorial control, 
bribery, and constraint to public officers from police to political leaders.
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Exploring Alternatives to Overcome DTOs Derived 
Violence
In this work, I have developed three main arguments around 
how drug-trafficking in Colombia hinders non-repetition and the 
strengthening of democracy from the outset of persisting structural 
violence that fuels DTOs. Accordingly, I will build on the arguments 
to discuss some alternatives to overcome drug-trafficking’s effects.
The first section was mainly a discussion around the concepts 
of war and civil war, as well as how much it fits the phenomenon of 
drug-trafficking. In this sense, the alternative could also be to adopt 
a concept of just war, by admitting that wars happen, and while 
they do, there is an obligation to guarantee the rights of people and 
communities (Giraldo, 2009, p. 217).
Taking this concept as a guideline, it could be expected that 
DTOs became more aware of the effects they cause in civilians. 
Nonetheless, there are two main problems: the first one is that they 
have no obligation toward civil society (as different from any other 
citizen), and they have not adopted an International Humanitarian 
Law framework; the second one is that they do not have any sort of 
recognition as an armed party in a civil war. In other words, they 
are criminals that exercise violence and are combated as such. In 
the end, it is not likely that they will autonomously adopt a behavior 
according to the just war concept that would lead towards a reduction 
of their use of violence.
In the second section I presented the argument about the gray 
zone where drug trafficking lies; more specifically, the derived 
violence by the action of DTOs. In this matter, the alternative is to 
extend the mandate of International Humanitarian Law to deal with 
those responsible within or associated with DTOs, after recognizing 
their warfare capacity and systematic violation of civil population 
human rights, as well as of any other insurgent groups.
Unfortunately, in realistic terms this is the least favorable and 
expedite for the Colombian case, as it was concluded that such 
an intervention is not desirable for the country. Also, the mere 
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debate around the entrance of the ICC could lead to an escalation 
of violence in the country, as it was seen during the agreement on 
extradition with the United States at the end of the 20th century. 
Additionally, even within transitional justice, there are existing 
debates on the applicability of the duty to criminally prosecute and 
its consequences (Sánchez & Uprimny, 2019), so thinking about 
introducing such an alternative can generate noise and discomfort. 
From my perspective, it would be easier to promote the idea of just 
war by recognizing the elements imprinted in the violence engaged 
with drug-trafficking organizations than to change the existing 
international legal framework for this particular interest. In order 
to make a specific distinction, the first step would have to be the 
creation of a different category that gathers the elements presented 
by insurgencies and those of organized crime groups.
Another possibility is to activate transitional justice 
mechanisms to deal with these particular actors only if after a 
context diagnosis they represent a threat to the consolidation 
of peace. As a matter of fact, this could result in an interesting 
exercise, as it would have to be determined whether typical armed 
conflict strategies could work with DTOs.
In my proposal, just as in transitional justice the mechanisms 
adopted change from case to case, it would be necessary to analyze 
whether some strategies might help. Actually, a special mechanism 
designed to boost democratic practices within institutions and 
civilians would be of great use to countries like Colombia. In contrast, 
I consider that strategies like negotiation are not as applicable to 
these groups due to their core interests.
Evidence from truces between gangs and governments have 
already taken place, such as the one between the government of El 
Salvador and gangs in Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha (Kalyvas, 
2015, p. 10). As a result, the homicide rate decreased 57 % between 
2011 and 2012 (Kalyvas, 2015). Beyond the lack of cartels’ political 
or ideological ground for a peace negotiation, efforts should be 
invested toward halting the violence cartels engender, recovering 
the monopoly of the same, and (re)gaining full territorial control 
of the state.
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Controversially, one of the biggest obstacles toward ending 
drug cartels through negotiation is corruption. The fight against 
illegal economies, not only drug trafficking, is notably challenging 
because it reproduces a vicious circle. The hardest task is to shift 
the elite’s interests and have them prioritize social wellbeing over 
personal revenue from these economies (Lessing, 2018). Likewise, it 
encompasses the strengthening of the democratic system, which is 
not among their interests since it is precisely its weakness that allows 
political elites to make personal profit.
Another setback of talking about negotiating with cartels is 
what the state has to offer. Drug trafficking is lucrative because 
it is illegal, so from that point, it is already hard to think of 
something that could compete with the cash inflow that the 
drug chain offers. Additionally, since this kind of groups have a 
hierarchical organization, a negotiation with one drug lord does 
not translate into the group’s dismantling (Medina, 2012), as 
many others are ready to fill in the position and carry on with 
the trafficking. In sum, an alternative can be sketched from the 
adoption of certain treatments given to insurgencies but not all, 
just as it happens with the organized crime definition for DTOs, 
it is adequate but not accurate.
From another perspective, if the state and organized crime do 
not cooperate, then indiscriminate violence increases (Albarracín 
& Barnes, 2020), but if they do work together, then democracy is hit 
by corruption and political power if seized by illegal armed groups 
that will continue to affect civilians. One thing these two ways have 
in common is the lack of the monopoly of violence from the state, 
which makes it especially difficult to find an alternative focused 
on protecting people and communities, while a weak democracy is 
incapable of fully guaranteeing the rule of law.
Lastly, in the third section I developed the idea of tackling drug-
trafficking effects with holistic strategies, in consonance with the 
way transitional justice is to be implemented. This comes from the 
idea of harmonizing the obligations that states may have that enter 
in conflict (Sánchez & Uprimny, 2019, p. 50). In other words, this 
means to balance the obligation to address violence imparted on 
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civil population whilst guaranteeing non-repetition, even if that 
means to reshape its institutions until the point where they are fully 
capable of ensuring the rule of law.
Regarding the Colombian case, as it was discussed in the 
third section, decentralization had an important impact on local 
and regional political dynamics. DTOs, private and political 
parties became closer while the power of such organizations grew 
and consolidated at the different government levels. Ballots and 
arms became a constant during elections, candidates and elected 
representatives assumed great risks of being assassinated or acted in 
cooperation with DTOs and/or other illegal armed groups. This not 
only represents a blow to democracy, it extends to society as the 
political culture was deterred by the illegal parties’ influence.
For example, between 1978 and 2010, abstentionism for 
presidential elections in Colombia had an average of 54 % 
(Registraduría Nacional, 2013) with only two years with an 
abstention below 50 %. This indicates that the absolute winner for 
the highest office in a democracy for the past twelve elections has 
been the abstentionism. I acknowledge Colombians have a number 
of difficulties at the time of voting because of the long hours citizens 
have to walk or travel, and the effort it represents for those living in 
distant rural areas. Despite those facts, the statistics do not lose any 
relevance. Another example is the plebiscite for peace in 2016, where 
either by difficulty, lack of interest or mere civic irresponsibility, 
abstentionism reached 62,59 %, surpassing presidential elections of 
2014 (Álvarez & Garzón, 2016).
After reflecting upon the utopic ideal that DTOs adopt a logic 
of just war where life and rights of people and communities is to 
prevail over private interests, analyzing the difficulty in broadening 
the scope of international public law toward drug-trafficking derived 
violence, and considering the idea of a new mechanism, or an 
international intervention, the alternatives seem to lead to either 
utopic or fatalistic ends. On the bright side, the previous data on 
abstentionism, despite being discouraging, contributes to shape the 
one positive alternative of the present text: increasing the efforts to 
foster political culture and citizenship.
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The alternative has two explanations, where the first one is 
that in drug-trafficking contexts decision makers are coerced or 
threatened by DTOs harm capacity, making it almost impossible to 
succeed on the war on drugs. The second is that the design and 
implementation of an eventual special body in charge of “cleaning” 
democracies with DTOs presence is not very likely to take place, 
or even if it did, it would constitute a significant grand scale social 
experiment. In consequence, transitional justice has documented 
that there are bottom-up and top-down strategies to work toward 
peace and reconciliation (Quinn, 2009), and for this particular case 
a bottom-up strategy focused on civic responsibilities can not only 
advance toward transition’s intermediate objectives of recognition 
and civic trust, but also build on the strengthening of democracy 
that could ultimately guarantee non-repetition as it gets “cleansed” 
from the clutches of DTOs.
A bottom-up strategy of political culture can make emphasis 
in the importance of different levels of governments, judicial 
mechanisms, and collective responsibility (Arendt, 1968) while 
overcoming abstentionism and indifference. After reviewing 
alternatives and exploring different angles of the violence exerted by 
DTOs, this is the way in which a country in transition like Colombia, 
with a legacy of drug wars, can potentially secure peace, or at least, 
negative peace. It also encompasses funds allocations and a serious 
compromise from social organizations, international agencies, and 
even national institutions to opt for political culture as a strategic 
move toward the strengthening of democracy and non-repetition. I 
acknowledge it is a long shot and a bet on long-term results, which 
are not the most popular among policy makers, but after years of 
failure in the Drug on Wars strategy and the endemic violence that 
drug-trafficking has introduced in the Colombian civil war, after 40 
years of cartels, gangs, and other types of DTOs, it is worth taking 
political culture with seriousness and commitment.
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Conclusion
The present work started from the baseline of drug trafficking as 
a generator and breeder of violence fueled by the structural violence 
conditions in which the Colombian population lives. The objective 
was to discuss whether drug trafficking hinders non-repetition and 
the rule of law after developing three main arguments around: a) the 
employability of concepts such as war and civil war to determine its 
relatability with drug-trafficking organizations violent actions; b) the 
existence of a gray zone that impedes the mediation of international 
humanitarian law to mediate the responsibility, accountability and 
reparation of victims from those associated or active members of 
DTOs, and c) the nuance in violence’s effect on democracy, especially 
under the light of transitional justice. Alternatives were explored 
to find solution-oriented strategies that might have the capacity to 
advance toward democracy and non-repetition altogether with the 
interest on breaking the cycle of violence in the country.
Alternatives were explored in alignment with the three main 
arguments, whose findings showed that most of the alternatives are 
long-term strategies that need compromise, funding and political 
interest. Also, most of them led to either fatalist or utopian ends. 
The one alternative that seems to outline a way around violence 
is that of collective responsibility in the shape of political culture. 
Despite being also a long-term approach, it is the one that proposes 
a positive view of the years ahead.
Overall, the thesis is proved by the three arguments as there is 
no way to guarantee non-repetition in the Colombian context while 
DTOs persist, especially the derived violence usually exercised over 
the already victimized civil population. As a result, further research 
is promoted on fostering the political culture during ongoing conflict, 
and on how democracies can be “cleansed” during transitioning 
processes, where the change is not from dictatorship to democracy. 
Another promising line of research leads us to determine whether, 
and how, the level of independence of special mechanisms influence 
their outcomes in terms of truth, justice, reparation and non-
repetition, taking as an example the Peace and Justice tribunal 
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